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A zero-metadata, no-registration encrypted messenger. Your key, your rules — everything else is redacted.
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In 2024 German investigators deanonymised a Ricochet user without breaking Tor or the cipher — they timed the network and made the ISP name the subscriber. The reason it worked, and the one design choice that removes th…
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:24 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →The cipher is the solved problem. The leaks live in the margins — the traffic a deaf relay still sees, and the phone someone can take from your hand. Two new defenses: shaped metadata, and a decoy profile for when you'r…
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:24 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Every other messenger chooses a default and hopes you never ask. YGOOW refuses: you pick how each conversation is protected, or you don't chat. Here is why that bluntness is the feature.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:24 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →A message in YGOOW passes through up to five independent layers — transport, Tor, the end-to-end channel, locked content, and a lifetime. What each one does, in plain terms, and why they are separate on purpose.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:24 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →A wrong key, a missing key, and a message that was never yours all produce the same locked block — no error, no hint, no oracle. How YGOOW's 'Variant C' trial-decryption works, and where it ends.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Why a twenty-year-old idea — anonymous, account-free data sharing — is finally shipping as an encrypted messenger.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →YGOOW technical whitepaper — architecture, the cryptography that runs in the app and what is built but not yet in it, a hidden profile measured over a lifetime, measured side channels and traffic analysis, one-time Dead…
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →What YGOOW protects, what it deliberately does not, and why a server that never holds your keys cannot be made to surrender them.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →How to report a vulnerability in YGOOW — contact, scope, and our coordinated-disclosure commitments.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →YGOOW makes you choose how a conversation is protected — there is no insecure default. Three levels, in plain terms: what each one hides, and what a stolen phone would reveal.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →What YGOOW has built for security and anonymity, what we measured, and what is still ahead — a public ledger with the gaps named, not rounded off.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →A plain-language glossary of the ideas behind YGOOW — metadata, forward secrecy, post-quantum, Tor, entropy, quorum and more — each with what it actually means for your safety.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Impressum / legal notice for YGOOW — Angaben gemäß § 5 DDG.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Frequently asked questions about YGOOW — keys, Tor, accounts, and what the server can and can't see.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Datenschutzerklärung für YGOOW — was der blinde Relay-Server (kaum) speichert, auch für einmalige Notizen (Dead Drop), nach DSGVO.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →A one-time encrypted note: sealed in your browser, read once, then gone. The key lives only in the link — our server never sees the words.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →An honest comparison of YGOOW with Signal, Session, and Briar — what is genuinely different, and where the others are still ahead today.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →YGOOW warrant canary — a signed statement about the legal demands we have, and have not, received.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Germany's Bescheinigungsstelle Forschungszulage (BSFZ) reviewed the seven research projects behind YGOOW and confirmed every one of them as research and development. What that seal says — and three things it doesn't.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →In 2020 police read tens of thousands of EncroChat users' messages without breaking the encryption — they owned one central system and harvested everyone at once. Here is what actually happened, and the single architect…
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Notes on privacy, Tor, and building a zero-metadata messenger.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:23 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →YGOOW for Android — an encrypted messenger with no accounts, no phone number and Tor by default. What it does, how to start, and what to expect.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:22 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →Nutzungsbedingungen (AGB) für den Ende-zu-Ende-verschlüsselten Messenger YGOOW und einmalige Notizen (Dead Drop).
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:22 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →A zero-metadata, no-registration encrypted messenger. Your key, your rules — everything else is redacted.
Last crawled: 04 Oct 2026 17:22 UTCScreenshot queued · Request priority →
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